Computational Modeling and Simulation of Attitude Change. Part 1, Connectionist Models and Simulations of Cognitive Dissonance: an Overview by Voinea, Camelia Florela
www.ssoar.info
Computational Modeling and Simulation of
Attitude Change. Part 1, Connectionist Models and
Simulations of Cognitive Dissonance: an Overview
Voinea, Camelia Florela
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Voinea, C. F. (2013). Computational Modeling and Simulation of Attitude Change. Part 1, Connectionist Models and
Simulations of Cognitive Dissonance: an Overview. European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 2(3),
10-26. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-349764
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Author: Dr. Camelia Florela Voinea, Associate Professor 
Affiliation: Department of Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, 
Romania 
Address: #24, St. Stephan Street – 023997 Bucharest, Romania 
e-mail: camelia.voinea@fspub.unibuc.ro  
 
Copyright @ 2013 Camelia Florela Voinea 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities - EQPAM, Volume2, No.3, July 2013, pp.  10-26. 
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN–L 2285 – 4916  
 
/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities  EQPAM  
Vol.2, No.3, July 2013 
                      ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                      ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
 
Page 10 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported 
License. 
 
Computational Modeling and Simulation of Attitude Change 
Part 1:  
Connectionist Models and Simulations of Cognitive Dissonance. An Overview 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Camelia Florela Voinea 
Department of Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies 
Faculty of Political Science 
University of Bucharest,  
Bucharest, Romania 
 
Date of submission: May 24th, 2013     Submission of Revised Version: July 22th, 2013     Date of acceptance: July 24th, 2013 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory is considered part of the cognitive consistency theories in Social Psychology. 
They uncover a class of conceptual models which describe the attitude change as a cognitive consistency-
seeking issue. As these conceptual models requested more complex operational expression, algebraic, 
mathematical and, lately, computational modeling approaches of cognitive consistency have been 
developed. Part 1 of this work provides an overview of the connectionist modeling of cognitive dissonance. At 
their time, these modeling approaches have revealed that a Computational Social Psychology project would 
acquire the community recognition as a new scientific discipline. This work provides an overview of the first 
computational models developed for the Cognitive Dissonance Theory. They are connectionist models based 
eitheron on the constraint satisfaction paradigm or on the attributional theory.Three models are described: 
Consonance Model (Shultz and Lepper, 1996), Adaptive Connectionist Model for Cognitive Dissonance (Van 
Owervalle and Joders, 2002), and the Recurrent Neural Network Model for long-term attitude change 
resulting from cognitive dissonance reduction (Read and Monroe, 2007). These models, and some others, 
proved from the very beginning the considerable potential for the development of cognitive modeling of the 
theories of cognitive dissonance. Revisiting the Cognitive Dissonance Theory once again only proves that 
this potential is even larger than expected. 
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1. Introduction 
Cognitive Dissonance has been considered one of the most relevant theories in Social Psychology. Since 
1957, when it has been formulated by Leon Festiger, the theory has provided the background for attitude 
change research. Its history and concept have been presented in many articles, books, handbooks, 
sourcebooks and encyclopedic works: Abelson et al. 1968; Aronson, 1969; 1992; 1997; Cooper and Fazio, 
1984; Eagley and Chaiken, 1993; Cooper, 2007, to name but a few, emphasizing its huge potential for 
further development and application as both conceptual and computational models in cognitive, social and 
political sciences on issues going from self-affirmation to cultural diversity and social value change. 
In its more than half-century history, research interest in Cognitive Dissonance Theory has been 
renewed several times, inducing conceptual and modeling advances. Its research domain grows and varies 
sometimes unexpectedly. A good example is the current renewed interest in cognitive dissonance research 
in the scientific and academic (online) media from Eastern Europe, Middle East, African, and Extreme-
Orient countries1. Therefore, synthetic works on its history and concept are helpful in providing a 
comprehensive perspective over its beginnings, development and advances. Moreover, a thorough 
approach of the past usually helps in better appreciate the present and the future. This works for the 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory and not only.    
 
2. History and Concept 
Attitude is a central concept in Social Psychology. When analyzing social behavior, the issue of attitude 
change is fundamental for predicting the behavior of both individuals and collectivities. Attitude change is 
considered the source of behavioral expression and variability.  
As it has been defined by Festinger (Festinger, 1957), the cognitive dissonance is an attitude 
change mechanism: it denotes a cognitive state of imbalance called “dissonance” and concerns the 
cognitive tensions which emerge from inconsistencies between beliefs and actions. Such imbalance states 
act as adriving forces towards attitude change either by modifying the attitude or by increasing the 
consistency of beliefs.  
Deeply influenced by the Gestalt theory at its beginnings, conceptual and formal models of attitude 
change have been mainly concerned with experimental psychology (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Lately, 
cognitive dissonance theories have evolved towards more dynamic, complex views of the cognitive states 
and processes. The Gestalt-inspired ideas of equilibrium and consistency-seeking mechanisms of human 
cognition have remained the classical approach in dissonance reduction models, while new ideas about 
multiple, inconsistent, simultaneously active beliefs which shape our attitudes and actions have increasingly 
gained attention and credit (Wilson, Lindsay and Schooler, 2000; Cohen and Read, 2006). Computational 
modeling and simulation approaches have actually started to develope as these new ideas penetrated the 
classical Gestaltian framework of cognitive consistency theories. 
Research on computational modeling and simulation of cognitive dissonance is headed towards 
developing prediction tools for the evolution of societal phenomena like major value change, social and 
                                                          
1 Metin I., Camgoz S.M. 2011. The Advances in the History of Cognitive Dissonance Theory, International Journal of Humanities 
and Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No.6, June 2011, online at url: <http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol._1_No._6;_June_2011/14.pdf> 
accessed on July 22nd, 2013. The literature on the cognitive dissonance issue concerns the most diverse and unexpected areas 
like history, religion, ethnicity, culture. For getting an idea of the nature of interest in this subject, see:  
De Moraes Farias P.F., 2010. Local Landscapes and Constructions of World Space: Medieval Inscriptions, Cognitive 
Dissonance, and the Course of the Niger , Afriques. Debats, methodes et terrains d’histoire, 02-2010 : Histoire de territoires, 
openEdition at url : <http://afriques.revues.org/896> accessed on July 22nd, 2013. 
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political change, social and political persuasion, social role. From this perspective, cognitive dissonance 
theories, as part of general theories of human cognition within the realm of Social Psychology, seem to 
have an unexpected potential for further development. 
Following the huge interest in Social Psychology, especially in Social Influence Theory, from 
arround late 1910s until the end of the 1930s, attitude reasearch has mainly focused on definition and 
measurement. It was the time when great names like Thomas and Zaniecki (1918-1920), Leon Thurstone 
(1929), or Gordon Allport(1935), to name but a few, have introduced the concept of attitude and started to 
develop theories on attitude measurement concepts and instruments (Voinea, 2012). Soon afterwards, its 
focus has shifted towards general theories of cognition and theories of cognitive consistency with a major 
Gestaltian influence (Eagly and Chaiken 1993): Balance Theory (Heider, 1946, 1958),  Congruity Theory 
(Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955), Symmetry Theory (Newcomb, 1953), affective-cognitive consistency 
model (Rosenberg, 1956), and Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957). By the end of the 1960s, 
the interest in the area vanished mainly because the cognitive dissonance static framework of interpersonal 
relations “in vogue” at that time did not offer much insight in the research of mental analysis (Simon and 
Holyoak, 2002). 
Later developments in consistency theories proved a renewed interest for the cognitive dissonance 
theory, which has been the dominating theory in Social Psychology until the late 1970s. 
New experimental approaches  (Aronson, 1992; Harmon-Jones and Milles, 1999; Harmon-Jones 
E. & C., 2003) shed light on new theories of Social Psychology with a special focus on cognitive 
dissonance: self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), symbolic self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 
1982), self-evaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1988), self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1989), and 
action identification theory (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). 
 
 
3. Structural Dynamics 
The cognitive theories developed within the Social Psychology have initially represented attitudes as 
memory-stored evaluations of the attitudinal objects. This kind of representation has been changed as 
further researches in Cognitive Psychology revealed that attitudes seem to be rather re-constructions of the 
perceived and/or imagined attitudinal objects. Introduced initially by Barlett in his seminal work on 
remembering (Bartlett, 1932), this idea has gained a major influence in cognitive consistency research 
(thorough reviews in (Wilson and Hodges, 1992), and (Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000)).  
The cognitive theories are concerned with the organization, structure and dynamics of the cognitive 
processes (Zajonc, 1968). Structural dynamics refers to the unstable characteristics of the cognitive 
structural aspects. One such aspect regards the cognitive states, which are viewed as a result of merely 
the interaction of the structural elements and not of the structural  elements themselves. This aspect has 
been modeled as a first principle of the structural dynamics of cognitive consistency.  
Research on cognitive consistency is based on four main principles of structural dymanics (Read, 
Snow and Simon, 2004): (1) a cognitive state is considered to have a holistic nature, and it is produced as 
a result of the interaction of all its structural elements; (2) these interactions provide for the cognitive 
structural dynamics; (3) the structural dynamics settles down in equilibrium states, (which, in the cognitive 
dissonance theory, are called “consonance states”), and (4) cognitive consistency involves reconstructions 
processes of the cognitive structure, that is, modifications at both the semantic level (by modifications of the 
meanings of the structural elements), and at the structural level (by acquiring new elements).  
    
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities  EQPAM  
Vol.2, No.3, July 2013 
                      ISSN 2285 – 4916                      
        ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 13 
This last principle has shaped a certain type of approach in computational modeling of cognitive 
consistency: models should be concerned with the dynamics of cognitive structures which consist in 
multiple, simultaneuosly active and simultaneoulsy varying elements.  
 
 
4. Computational Modeling of Attitudes  
Computational Modeling has become a basic research tool in Computational Sociology and in virtual 
experimental social and political analysis research. It provides the appropriate conceptual framework and 
instruments for a constructive approach to the research of attitudes in large human collectivities.  
Computational modeling of social and political attitudes is useful in the simulation of the social 
behavior of large communities. During the past three decades, ccomputational simulations have been 
intensively used in the advent of experimental research on large social communities or entire societies.    
There are several kinds of computational modeling approaches. The classical approach is the 
functional-descriptive model, which is designed so as to capture a fundamental attribute or functionality of a 
real system in few mathematical equations. The equations describe the behavior of the modeled system. 
Input data is then provided to the model and its outputs are used to analyse the behavior of the model and 
to approximate or predict the potential behavior of the real system in given contexts. Varying the contexts, 
the behavior of the model varies itself so as to capture essential aspects of the behavior of the real system. 
Another type of approach is the artificial network model inspired by biological and neurological 
researches of the human organism and brain. This type of model works with a collection of nodes and their 
connections. The structure of the model, namely (i) the types of nodes and their activation parameters, (ii) 
the type of relational elements and their parameters, (weights), determines the behavioral characteristics of 
the model. Depending on the type of artificial network, input data are then loaded into the model so as to 
provide various degrees of activation levels to the input nodes. The overall output of the model represents 
its behavior. The model is run usually for a large number of times, so as to make observable the 
characteristics of its overall behavior and the micro-macro relations underlying this behavior. 
 
 
5. Computational Modeling and Simulation of Cognitive Dissonance 
Attitude research, in general, and cognitive dissonance theories, in particular, have provided a considerable 
number of conceptual models of attitude structure, formation and change. These conceptual models relied 
on early operational views, which provided for a formal (algebraic) modeling approach on the 
balanced/imbalanced states and the way humans strive to achieve consistency by attitude change (Heider, 
1946; 1958).  
Heider’s operational model concerns cognitive states (balanced or imbalanced). Cognitive states 
are hold by cognitive units. A cognitive unit consists of three elements and the pairwise relationships 
between them. The structural elements of the cognitive unit are: (1) a Person, P, whose behavior is to be 
explained, another Person, P’, and (3) the attitudinal Object, O. The relationships between the elements of 
a cognitive unit may be either positive or negative. In this model, a cognitive state is balanced or 
imbalanced depending on the number of signed (positive/negative) inter-elements relations only. As a 
cognitive state becomes imbalanced (meaning that an inconsistency between attitude and behavior 
occured), the Person (whose behavior has to be explained) tries to modify her own attitude and/or behavior 
in order to avoid inconsistency.  
In spite of Heider’s very influent and persistent operational model, cognitive consistency theories 
have shifted their interest towards operational frameworks able to describe the consistency-seeking 
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cognitive structures in dynamic terms, which seemed more appropriate in the context of the advent of 
attribution theories and reconstructive approaches to attitude change. 
Interest in developing more adequate operational models of cognitive consistency has stirred the 
orientation of research in the direction of computational modeling. 
During the mid’ 90s, there has been developed the first type of computational modeling and 
simulation model: the connectionist model. It has been approached in various alternatives, each variant 
improving the modeling performances by means of (a) the type of connectionist network used for modeling, 
(b) the consistency-seeking mechanism, and (c) the structural and dynamic description of cognitive units 
and states. 
 
 
6. Cognitive Theories and Connectionist Modeling  
By the 1990s, cognitive theories research in Cognitive and Social Psychology have found the newly 
appeared Connectionist Models as a fascinating modeling instrument: it provided the means to represent 
conceptual structures and, most important, to use these representations for the simulation of cognitive 
processes. 
The Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) Model (Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986), also called Connectionist Model, consist of multiple units (nodes) and their interconnections (links). 
Nodes have their integrative function specified by equation(s), while  the connections between nodes have 
coefficients of relevance (weights) assigned to them. A connectionist models operates like an integrative 
system: each node continuously sums up the information transmitted from all the other neighboring nodes. 
The information flow from one node to another is transmitted as level of activation, so that each node’s 
activation is always constrained by the levels of activation of the neighboring nodes. The spread of 
activation is controlled by the connection’s weights. This architecture and functionality had major 
implications for the kind of problems the Cognitive and Social Psychology research actually had at that time 
(Read and Miller, 1998). For the first time after the dyadic and tryadic paradigms have been used for 
representation research purposes, the connectionist models allowed for both a representation and an 
operational solution to the problem of representation of cognitive structures. 
The fundamental characteristic of the parallel distributed processing systems is their parallel type 
of operation: all nodes are simultaneously active (with various degrees of activation) providing as many 
pieces of information as nodes are, while each piece of information has a specific relevance (weight) in the 
system overall architecture and functionality.  
For cognitive structures, in particular, this kind of distributed system provided the means to create 
an overall semantics by combining the meanings conveyed by several cognitive units. The procedure is 
quite simple: each node provides a piece of information which is propagated as a level of activation to all 
neighboring nodes. The spreading of activations makes that each node is dependent on all the other nodes 
directly or remotely linked to it, stimulating or constraining therefore the activations of all neighboring nodes 
Nodes’ mutual interdependency  is controlled by the weights associated to each connection, such that each 
piece of information will get a particular degree of relevance in the overall output of the system. For 
cognitive consistency and consonance achieving tasks, this means that each unit in a conceptual structure 
will contribute to the overall consistency of the cognitive structure. As a constraint satisfaction algorithm is 
used, the contribution of each node to the global output will be accordingly adjusted so as the conceptual 
structure could achieve consistency (Read and Miller, 1994).  
These characteristics and principles of operation made of the connectionist networks the ideal 
design tool for developing appropriate computational models for cognitive consistency-seeking theoretical 
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models. Actually, cognitive consistency theories have been “revitalized” (Simon, Snow and Read, 2004) 
and “reformulated” (Simon and Holyoak, 2002; Read and Miller, 1998) much on the conceptual background 
offered by the connectionist theories of cognition. 
Connectionist models of cognitive consistency are usually implemented by neural networks. The 
type of network is however dependent on the type of problem which has to be solved. Types of neural 
networks include feedforward and feedback networks: each of the connectionist models described in the 
next section uses one of these two types of networks. 
Feedforward networks have no feedback connections among nodes. The nodes have 
unidirectional connections and the spread of activation is transmitted from the input layer to the output 
layer, usually in a single processing cycle. Repeated cycles allow for the network to settle down into a 
stable state, which is actually meant to describe the global cognitive consonance state. 
Feedback networks have feedback connections among their nodes. The nodes have bidirectional 
connections and the spread of activation has a special dynamics. The excitatory / inhibitory connections 
moderate the dynamic behavior of the nodes. The network needs many processing cycles to settle down 
into a stable state. Nodes’ activations are updated at each cycle and, because of their feedback 
connections, they behave like dynamic units. If we assign each node a particular (weighted) constraint, 
then this kind of network operates like a parallel constraint satisfaction system, which represents the 
fundamental aspect for the connectionist models of cognitive consistency (Read and Miller, 1998). The 
constraint satisfaction algorithm provides for different levels of activation for each node (constraint), 
simultaneously. As bidirectional connections allow the nodes connected by excitatory links to mutually 
stimulate each other, the network will finally result in a set of nodes with highest activation levels, which 
represent the active variables in the cognitive structure. All the other nodes would have lower levels of 
activation, since their connections are consequently inhibited by the set of highly-active nodes (Simon and 
Holyoak, 2002). 
Since a cognitive structure represented with this connectionist model can be associated with a 
person’s set of beliefs, afects, knowledge and cognitive experience, the model enhances experimental 
settings and behavioral simulations of collections of individuals. The various contexts of such experimental 
settings are characterized by cognitive consistency-inconsistency, consonance-dissonance or coherence-
ambiguity features. 
 
 
7. The Constraint Satisfaction Modeling Paradigm of Cognitive Dissonance  
Analogical mapping has been intensively studied in Cognitive Psychology and Artificial Intelligence as a 
means to provide the artificial mind with cognitive attributes, processes and functions (Hall, 1989; Gentner, 
1983;  Winston, 1984). Analogical mapping has been defined as a representation mapping from a known 
domain (called the source) to a new domain (called the target domain) oftenly involved in learning, 
problem-solving and decision making processes (Hall, 1989). As a cognitive process, analogical reasoning 
is based on identification and evaluative processes of the structural correspondences between source and 
target domains. Thus, the structural consistency and the semantic similarity of the corresponding structural 
elements become major requirements in an analogical reasoning model. As an analogical reasoning 
paradigm, constraint satisfaction has been used in modeling the analogical constraint mapping processes 
which require the integration in an unique overall solution of the “interacting structural, semantic, and 
pragmatic constraints” between  source and target analogs (Holyoak and Thagard, 1988).  
For computational modeling of cognitive consistency, the constraint satisfaction paradigm provides 
a practical solution to the problem of management and control of the simultaneously active relationships 
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among cognitive structural elements: beliefs, affects, information, and knowledge acquired from past and 
ongoing cognitive and behavioral experiences. 
Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance actually models the human reasoning in situations in 
which the human agent holds opposite cognitions with respect to the same attitudinal object and 
experiences an unpleasant state of attitudinal imbalance, called “cognitive dissonance”. Once aroused, the 
cognitive dissonance becomes a motivational “engine”, which drives the agent towards reducing the 
magnitude of dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Approaching the concept of “attitudinal imbalance”, th is theory 
explains how humans strive to achieve the balance by modifying the attitude structural elements, and their 
relationships altogether with the goal of increasing their cognitive consistency.  
A further theoretical approach of the cognitive dissonance from a human reasoning modeling 
perspective,  the Symbolic Psycho-Logic Theory (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958), provided a unified 
procedural framework for modeling the modifications of the relationships among attitudinal structural 
elements in the cognitive dissonance scenario.  
Nevertheless, computational modeling of the cognitive dissonance started to develop only much 
later. Its development has been facilitated by the computational connectionist theories and models which 
emerged during the 1990s. What have actually bound together the cognitive dissonance theoretical 
modeling and the connectionist computational modeling domains were the analogical reasoning and the 
constraint satisfaction paradigms applied to consistency-seeking problems in attitude change models 
(Simon and Holyoak, 2002).  
Constraint satisfaction mechanism has been intensively used in in computational models of high-
level cognitive process: ACME Model of analogical mapping (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989);  ECHO Model  for 
the evaluation of competing explanations (Thagard, 1989)  and SEA Model for achieving semantic 
coherence in concept learning (Voinea, 1991). It has been succesfully combined with the connectionist 
mechanism of representation and modification of large conceptual structures involved in the computational 
modeling of dissonace reduction systems (Read and Miller, 1994). Connectionist representation of 
cognitive concepts and processes has offered the possibility to model the dynamics of consistency 
achieving processes in attitude structural change models (Read and Miller, 1994; Read, Vanman and 
Miller, 1997; Read and Monroe, 2007). For cognitive dissonance research, in particular, the constraint 
saisfaction paradigm provided a proper means to model the dissonance reduction processes (Spellman, 
Ullman and Holyoak, 1993; Shultz and Lepper, 1996; Van Owervalle and Jonders, 2002). 
 
 
8. Cognitive Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance Connectionist Models 
This paper selects three cognitive dissonance connectionist models. These models, and some others, 
proved the considerable potential for the development of cognitive and social psychology modeling of the 
theories of cognitive dissonance. Good examples in this sense would be the computational modeling 
approaches on cognitive dissonance and on how it can be related to (1) the issue of personal responsibility 
attribution (Sakai and Andow, 1981), (2) the issue of opinion change (Sakai, 1981), and (3) the issue of 
cultural differences in cognitive dissonance (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Sakai, 2013). 
All the three approaches described bellow model cognitive dissonance reduction as a cognitive 
consistency-seeking problem. A comparative presentation has been possible since they either address the 
same experimental scenarios (i.e.:prohibition to play with toy in the settings described by Freedman, 1965) 
or the same dissonance-reduction paradigm (constraint satisfaction). Another common characteristics is 
that they all represent attitudes as memory-stored evaluations, and use localist representations of the 
cognitive structure (concept representation is one-to-one with respect to the nodes in the network). 
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However, there are some relevant differences which provide for different performances and for a 
different modeling of the human cognitive dissonance processes, in general, and cognitive dissonance 
processes, in particular.  
The dissonance-reduction paradigms are: (a) constraint satisfaction connectionis model (used by 
both Shultz and Lepper’s Consonance Model, and Read and Monroe’ RNN model for cognitive dissonance 
reduction), which allows the system to reduce dissonance by achieving a Gestalt-inspired global cognitive 
state of consistency (“consonance”); (b) attribution connectionist model (used by the Van owervalle and 
Jonders’ AC-CD  model), which allows the system to reduce dissonance by attitude change, where the 
attitude change results from avoinding inconsistencies by modifying the cognitive structure on a causal 
explanations basis. 
The types of artificial network are different from one model to another: some uses feedforward 
(Consonance Model and AC-CD Model), while other uses feedback artificial network (Read and Monroe’s 
RNN model for cognitive dissonance reduction). 
The types of representation with artificial networks is different: some uses localist representation 
(Consonance Model), while another uses a combination of localis and distributed representation (Read and 
Monroe’s RNN model for cognitive dissonance reduction). 
Two of these models use learning in order to enhance attitude change by discriminating between 
old and new evaluative judgements with respect to the attitudinal object (Van Owervall and Jonders’ AC-CD 
Model, and Read and Monroe’s RNN model for cognitive dissonance reduction). 
The simulations performed with these connectionist models are mainly based on the same 
experimental psychological settings: the “prohibition to play with toy” scenario, as described and explained 
by Freedman (1965). 
 
 
8.1. The Consonance Model (Shultz & Lepper, 1996)  
The Consonance Model2 concerns the dissonance-reducing problem in the constraint satisfaction paradigm 
(Shultz and Lepper, 1992, p.462). The connectionist model is used for the representation of a particular 
cognitive structure (belief system), which is assumed to include inconsistencies between attitude and 
behavior with respect to a particular attitudinal object. These structural inconsistencies generate a state of 
cognitive dissonance which has to be processed on the basis of constraint satisfaction algorithm.   
 
8.1.1. The Cognitive Structure 
The nodes in the network represent person’s cognitions (attitude, behavior, action, affect), and 
constraints on that person’s cognitions (threat), as well as relations between cognitions (psychological 
implication (Shultz and Lepper, 1992, p.464)).  
In this cognitive structure, the dissonance-reduction problem is approached as a consistency-
seeking task: the constraints should be simultaneously satisfied (with various degrees), so that the 
cognitive structure could achieve a global state of balance called “consonance”. 
 
8.1.2. Cognitive Dissonance Paradigms 
                                                          
2 Our description of the Consonance Model follows Authors’ descriptions and explanations published in three papers which 
provide the technical references for this section: (Shultz and Lepper, 1992; 1996) and (Shultz and Lepper, 1998). 
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In the Consonance Model, dissonance reduction is based on the heiderian concept of balance. The 
constraint satisfaction mechanism is used to implement the concept of balance as cognitive consistency of 
the cognitive structure.  
The dissonance-reduction is studied in several paradigms: insufficient justification via prohibition 
and free choice (Shultz and Lepper, 1992; 1996), insufficient justification via prohibition,  insufficient 
justification via initiation, and free choice (Shultz and Lepper, 1998; Shultz, Léveillé and Lepper, 1999). 
In the insufficient justification paradigm, the Actor involves in some counterattitudinal action with 
little justification or without justification at all. The paper presents simulations of the Freedman variant for 
the scenario of the nursery school children who were forbidden to play with a desirable toy in conditions of 
(a) non-surveillance and (b) surveillance.    
 
8.1.3. Representation 
Consonance Model uses a localist representation: each concept is associated with a node. The cognitive 
structure consist of cognitions (beliefs), which are representated as nodes (units), and relationships 
between the cognitions, which are represented as connections between the nodes. The nodes can be 
active or not; if active, they can have a various degree of activity between 0 and 1. Their activity is 
influenced by the weights associated to connections: the strength of the weights have a direct impact on 
each node’s level of activity (Figure 1).  
Each node (belief) is characterized by the value of its resistance to change: this parameter 
provides for the possibility to represent the way in which beliefs could be changed with the changing value 
of activation. Since nodes receive different values of activation via their weights, their resistance to change 
will be an important parameter of the overall consonance of the network. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  
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Consonance Model (Shultz and Lepper, 1992). Cognitive structure. 
 
 
A specific feature of the Consonance Model is that individual cognitions are represented as 
connections between two nodes with opposite activations: one node has a positive activation and stands 
for one pole of the cognition, while the other has a negative activation and stands for the other pole of the 
cognition. Such representations are called “dimensions”. Each dimension goes on a continuum from a 
positive value to a negative end value (Figure 2). This representation also asumes that the consonance or 
dissonance of the nodes in the network depends on the sign of the connection beetween any two nodes: 
two nodes (beliefs) are consonant if the weight of  their connection is positive.   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Consonance Model. 
Adaptation of the Shultz and Lepper’s Figure1 for the network for Freedman simulation (under non-surveillance condition) in: 
(Shultz, T. R., & Lepper, M. R., 1992; p.464).  
 
 
8.1.4. Simulations 
The dimension of interest in each simulation is represented by a pair of nodes (units). The 
connections within a pair of nodes represent the level of activation of a particular belief at any time. 
Connections across dimensions represent the relationships among beliefs. 
At the initial moment, the nodes are characterizd by their individual resistance to change parameter 
value, while the weights are initialized randomly with values between 0 and 1. In a single trial, the nodes 
are provided a random activation level. During each simulation cycle, a number of n nodes are selected 
and updated according to the rules of activation spread. Dissonance reduction is approached as a 
constraint satisfaction problem. A dimension of interest is simultaneously subject to the influences of the 
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neighboring nodes by means of their connection weights. The value of the consonance is calculated taking 
into consideration the levels of activation for all nodes and their resistance to change values. Consonance 
is increased by maximizing the constraint satisfaction output. 
 
 
 
8.2. Adaptive Connectionist Model of Cognitive Dissonance (Van Owervalle and Jordens, 2002) 
The Adaptive Connectionist Model of Cognitive Dissonance3, hereby AC-CD Model, works with an 
attributional approach on cognitive dissonance. As the authors describe it, the dissonance is attributed to 
the object, as a difference from the invoked Cooper and Fazio’s approach (1984), which attributes 
dissonant behavior to the Actor’s own responsibility (Van Owervalle and Jordens, 2002; p. 205). 
An attitude is described as a relationship between an attitudinal object and behavioral affective 
outcomes. Cognitive dissonance is described as a difference between the expected and the real outcome 
(affect, behavior). 
Dissonance reduction is achieved by attitude change, which is based on a learning mechanism 
aimed at minimizing the difference between expectations and real outcomes. 
 
8.2.1. Cognitive Structure 
The AC-CD Model concerns the dissonance-reducing problem in the attributional paradigm. The 
network is used for the representation of a particular cognitive structure: attitudes, behaviors, emotions. 
This cognitive structure is assumed to include inconsistencies between attitude and behavior with respect 
to the attitudinal object. These structural inconsistencies generate a state of cognitive dissonance which 
has to be resolved on an attributional basis: causal explanations are identified  with respect to the 
attitudinal object so as to justify an attitude change.   
The nodes in the network represent either subject’s cognitions (attitude, behavior, affect) or 
external factors (threat). Attitudinal object, and external factors are viewed as causal factors of the 
differences between Subject’s expectations and the real outcomes. In this cognitive structure, the 
dissonance-reduction problem is approached on a causal explanation basis: the discrepancies between the 
mental model and the real outcomes (behavior, affect) represent the cognitive dissonance. Once identified 
the causal explanations for these discrepancies, they provide the reasons for attitude change, which help in 
dissonance reduction. 
 
8.2.2. Cognitive Dissonance Paradigms 
While the Consonance Model is  based on the concept of balance, the AC-CD Model is based on 
the concepts of causality and causal explanation: instead of consistency-seeking mechanism, a causal 
explanation is searched within the cognitive structure (knowledge, past experience) so as to provide 
reasons for dissonance reduction.  
Dissonance reduction is based on attitude change which, in turn, relies on a causal explanation of 
the difference between mental model and real outcome of behavior ((Van Owervalle and Jordens, 2002; p. 
205). 
  
                                                          
3 Our description of the Adaptive Connectionist Model of Cognitive Dissonance follows Authors’ descriptions and explanations 
published in the paper which provide the technical references for this section: (Van Owervalle and Jordens, 2002). 
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8.2.3. Representation 
The AC-CD Model works on distributed representation of cognitions: an attitude representation 
uses multiple nodes in the network.  
The type of network used by the AC-CD Model is a standard feedforward network. The model 
includes new features with respect to Shultz and Lepper’s Consonance Model: representation of affect, and 
learning. 
Representation of dissonant cognitions, behaviors and affect is based on the “Affect-Behavior-
Cognitive” structure of attitudes inspired by the work of Rosenberg and Hovland (1960). An attitude is a 
memory-stored relationship between beliefs about the attitudinal object and two classes of responses: (1) 
behavior towards the attitudinal object and (2) affective outcomes of the interactions with the attitudinal 
object. The weights associated to the connections in the network represent the attitude’strength ((Van 
Owervalle and Jordens, 2002; p. 205).  
 
 
Figure 3.  
Adaptive Connectionist Model of Cognitive Dissoance (Van Owervalle and Jordens, 2002). 
(Adaptation of Van Owervalle and Jordens’ Figure1 for the specifications of the feedforward network model,  in : Van 
Owervalle and Jordens, 2002, p.207). 
 
 
 The nodes in the network are representations of causes and outcomes. The causes include the 
attitude object and the external factors (like, threat). The outcomes include behavior and affect. Outcomes 
could have multiple causes. 
Since the network is of feedforward type, the connections work unidirectional and represent causal 
explanations of the outcomes. Their associated weights represent strength of causal influence or intensity 
of attitude ((Van Owervalle and Jordens, 2002; p.207). 
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8.2.4. Simulations 
The cognitive dissonance is expressed by the difference between what is expected as outcome of 
an action choice with regard to an object (behavior) and the actual outcome (affect). Cognitive dissonance 
is therefore reduced by minimizing this difference by means of attitude change. This attitude change is 
achieved by weights adjustement (learning process). 
 The AC-CD Model is used to simulate the same cognitive dissonance paradigms like in Shultz and 
Lepper, 1996. Comparative analysis shows that the AC-CD Model achieves better performances due to the 
learning feature. 
 In the prohibition scenario, the network receive comparable input activation at both threat node 
(causal factor) and the toy node (object). Since the summed activation is approaching a zero value, the 
network indicates no attitude change. In the other two scenarios, the network receives (1) mild threat 
activation and (2) severe threat activation, the network output indicates an attitude change in the first case, 
and small or no attitude change in the second one. These results confirm the results described in the 
Freedman paradigm (1960).  
 
 
8.3. The RNN Model for long-term attitude change resulting from cognitive dissonance reduction (Read 
and Monroe, 2007) 
Read and Monroe (2007) developed a connectionist model based on a recurrent neural network 
which provides for attitude change as a result of cognitive dissonance reduction4. In contrast with the AC-
CD Model approach on dissonance reduction, Read and Monroe’s model approaches this problem in the 
old Gestaltian paradigm of cognitive balance. 
Read and Monroes’ connectionist model for cognitive dissonance tries to give solutions to the 
aspect remained unsolved by the previous models: the capacity of the network to achieve long-term 
attitude change by means of learning. To this purpose, the model (i) returns to the constraint satisfaction 
model in order to implement a dissonance-reduction model based on the Gestalt-inspired concept of 
consistency and (ii) uses a feeedback network able to learn evaluations and changes in evaluations, and 
therefore, provide for long-term attitude change. 
Like the AC-CD Model, this model also uses a learning algorithm. The differences from the AC-CD 
Model reside in (1) the type of network and in (2) the type of the learning mechanism.  
 
8.3.1. Cognitive structure 
The nodes in the Read and Monroe’s connectionist model are representations of beliefs, attitudes, 
behavioral outcomes/alternatives, evaluative task, objects and instrumental/contextual factors (i.e.:payment 
in the Festinger and Carlsmith’s scenario of counter-attitudinal advocacy, (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) 
(Figure 4).  
The cognitive structure has a flexible structure: it allows for adjustement of beliefs (attitudes) as the 
behavioral outcomes are or are not those expected.  
The flexibility of the cognitive structure is provided by the learning mechanism: the network is 
initially instructed with evaluations of the object and later on it is able to adjust those evaluations on new 
                                                          
4 Our description of the Recurrent Neural Network Model for long-term attitude change resulting from cognitive dissonance 
reduction follows Authors’ descriptions and explanations published in the paper which provide the technical references for this 
section: (Read and Monroe, 2007). 
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criteria which follow from the evaluations of behavioral alternatives. This evaluation follows a constraint 
satisfaction model. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 
Read and Monroe’s Recurrent Neural Network Model for Long-Term Attitude Change Resulting from Cognitive 
Dissonance Reduction (2007). 
(Adaptation of Read and Monroe’s Figure 2 on Network for Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) in: Read and Monroe, 
2007, p.589). 
 
 
8.3.2. Cognitive Dissonance Paradigm 
The constraint satisfaction paradigm is used for achieving consistency amongst different evaluations of the 
same object. The different evaluations result from comparing expectations with the outcomes of different 
behavioral alternatives. After repeated learning sessions, the network is able to discriminate between old 
and new evaluations, and to adjust the differences between evaluations as a dissonance reduction task. 
 
8.3.3. Representation 
The nodes representing the cognitive structure in the network have associated weights which take values in 
a continuum between -1 and +1 from positive to negative values, which allows for a mechanism of mutual 
inhibition between evaluative nodes.  
The pair of evaluative nodes is a technique used also in the Consonance Model, where it merely 
denotes a bipolar type of evaluation, while in the Read and Monroe’s model, it denotes a possibility to get 
separate independent evaluations (positive or negative) of the attitudinal object. This mechanism enhances 
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the capacity of the network to distinguish between behavioral alternatives and between old and new 
evaluations of the attitudinal object.  
This adaptive technique enhances the discrimination between different outcomes of behavioral 
alternatives and modification of the cognitive structure by introducing new evaluations. 
 
8.3.4. Simulation 
While the Delta Learning algorithm in the AC Model mainly adjusts the weights so as to capture instructor’s 
own evaluation changes with respect to the attitudinal object, the Contrastive Hebbian Learning (CHL) 
algorithm used by Read and Monroe is able to capture the evaluation changes by itself, which is a real 
improvement: in the AC-CD Model, the instructor “tells” the network how the evaluation changed, while in 
this model, the network itself is able to detect the evaluation changes. It thus provides for the attitude 
change by modifying the very cognitive structure (reflexive feature). Modifications of the cognitive structure 
then determine the dissonance reduction in a balance or consistency-seeking paradigm (Read and Monroe, 
2007; p. 588).  
 
 
9. Conclusions 
The paper presents three relevant connectionist models of cognitive dissonance. Although they 
have much in common, each model uses a different type of connectionist network, and a different paradigm 
of cognitive dissonance reduction mechanism. The persistent interest in the Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
and the advent of Computational Modeling explain the renewed evaluations and appreciation of dissonance 
research.  
Soon after the “boom” of connectionist models,  cognitive dissonance research has extended its 
reach so as to uncover cultural approaches on cognitive dissonance. This allowed for a revision of the 
theories on social role which address cognitive dissonance issues. Part 2 of this work is dedicated to a 
comparative analysis of this and other types of approaches on cultural issues and social role.  
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